From Pandemic to Terror Epidemic: Post-Taliban Afghanistan and Indo-Pak Relations
After the fortnight of Taliban’s very swift military action out of its hideouts in Pakistan and from latter’s involvement in the jihadi-styled operation to control Afghanistan it is perspicuous that whatever rosy picture we may draw about post-pandemic order with benevolent gesture of vaccine diplomacy, the dark clouds of ominous indication are hovering over Indian subcontinent. In the circumstances, India needs a very cautious approach because the configuration of things won’t be heading towards a smooth sailing to steer clear the political and security crisis anytime soon, nor the UN intervention seems likely to arrest the chaos and restore minimum dignity of the utter helplessness in which the civilians and foreign nationals are roiling. The situation is much like Yemen and Syria where civil war is continuing although return of Taliban means extreme Islamic fundamentalism that is driving own people to exile under extreme fear psychosis of persecution. The situation is grim and suspect more because the way three lacs Afghan forces succumbed to a far less numerically strong Taliban militia, it seems a sabotage much like fishy American understanding with Taliban that ruined the prospect of India’s sustained official line in favour of “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled peace process”. It is a matter of inexplicable puzzle as to why India wasted time when Doha talks were going on for months together because these talks as per Rudra Chaudhuri and Shreyas Shende who made clear in a recent explorative paper published by Carnegie India that Pakistan was directly backing Taliban both diplomatically and logistically, else “the discussions in Doha would have folded years ago”. This shows that the Doha talks were actually a negotiation between Islamabad and its ISI wing on one hand while USA on the other hand was under tremendous pressure because it was facing the heat from multiple corners since a nexus was steadily developing among radical Islamic groups like Al Qaeda, the IS, many Pakistani outfits including ISI and even China.
However, like India, if any other regional powers who found it hideous and obnoxious, it were Iran and Russia. Hence India should have been more active to engage with Russia and Iran from beforehand to neutralise such threat instead of her reliance on US engagement. This complacency, a leitmotif of Modi’s foreign policy is now turning into a bitter experience for New Delhi apart from her mistaken notion that differentiated between good and bad Taliban. Here it may be mentioned that as India is sympathetic to Pashtun nationalism, so is Iran worried for Taliban target of Shia Hazaras. So, there is a common point which can subtly bring together Teheran and New Delhi in rekindling “the Pashtun sense of identity that has traditionally been a thorn in the flesh of Pakistan.” Seen from this perspective, it seems that although violence is triggering the hysteria of anxiety and unrest in Afghanistan now, yet, rather than emotional catharsis, India’s astute policy towards Afghanistan ought to be to keep options open. That is to say, immediately after the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, India’s constructive role in Afghanistan’s politics will obviously be somewhat limited. Yet India should not hurry to counter the Haqqani network, controlled by the Pak Intelligence Agency and sponsored by the Arab states, even if it is likely to take over the vacuum after the exit of the US army. But to counter anti-India militant outfits like Laskar-i-Taiba and Jais-i-Mohammad to spread its wings on the fragile ground of Afghanistan, India, according to P. Stobdan, could sharpen its Pashtunistan strategy. To quote Stobdan, “India needs to start thinking how over 50 million Pushtuns living on both sides of the Durand Line—35 million on the Pakistani and 15 million in Afghanistan can be reunited.” No doubt that it is a very difficult task for India but if India can do it and moreover, if she can reach out to Pashtun Tahafuz Movement and can rack up the Durand line dispute then the game will turn against Pakistan. Thus, much of the unease will be solved if India can strengthen her historical ties with Pushtun tribes and the Baluchs because that would “ultimately snowball into Pakistan’s disintegration”.
Secondly, Taliban’s use of indiscriminate violence might be counter-productive also because such senseless violence will pave the way, according to G. Parthasarathy, for future Russian and Iranian intervention on the western border of Afghanistan. Already we can hope for a silver lining because Indian’s external Minister had intensive talks with US, Russia and even Iran’s newly elected President. So this will automatically mount pressure on Pakistan, the chief mentor cum supporter of Taliban.
Thirdly, we need to differentiate between the US and Pakistani approach. While the former lacks proper review of the ground reality in its desperate hurry to get rid of the situation marked by unabated violence and when ultimately the terms of Doha proved futile including intra-Afghan dialogue that could not be organised to pave the way for peaceful transfer of power, it is interesting to see how Pakistan even when it has a vested interest in keeping Afghanistan weak, planned systematically to spread hold over the Taliban and by deploying ISI to not only manoeuvre the Afghan theatre but also by re-orienting and re-directing the Pashtun movement in the land of majority of non-Pashtun communities by using Sunni Islamist propaganda. Here Pakistan made intelligent use of own madrasas to export the ideology of jihad and to carry it out, inculcated military values in society. Thus Pakistan’s strategy has been very innovative—to encourage warrior culture by conflating it with fanatic religious idealism and to channelize it towards hatred to India. To quote from the writing of Marika Vicziany of Monash University, “madrassas in Pakistan’s border regions have been used to recruit warriors for Afghanistan and Kashmir. This is not surprising, since many of these border madrassas cater specifically to displaced people from Afghanistan.” She adds subsequently “when the Afghan militia fled across the border into Pakistan during the Soviet occupation, they set up military camps which they called madrassas to give them some kind of respectability.” So we get a picture of how elements of institution, leadership, funds and religious discipline are inextricably interrelated and coalesced that not only leads to greater sectarianism but a creates a pervasive architecture of massive militarization of society and serves the state as faithful adjuncts.
According to Vicziany it is a poisonous monster of hatred that is nurtured to attack India. But as bomb may blast to take the life of its manufacturer, similarly the flame of terrorist violence may become boomerang to rip apart Pakistani society also. As such India need not worry to think that with the advent of Taliban Pakistan will immediately launch terror attack in Kashmir valley although both “share frosty ties and currently have a minimal diplomatic relations”. In that case as our Defence Minister said a few days ago, India is fully alert due to the changed security scenario and if necessary she would not hesitate to undertake another surgical strike into neighbour’s territory to neutralise any threat of insurgency. However the return of Taliban is definitely an advantage for Pakistan to tilt the balance of power in South Asia. But India should also ponder over to understand that unnecessary militarization or US approach of ‘regime change’ is not a panacea. To reiterate, India’s position should be to keep her options open both to engage with Taliban and keep working with the greater comity of nations while Pakistan being the culprit Frankenstein will have to justify its position vis-à-vis Taliban, its puppet regime.
