Moscow Dialogue for Peace in Afghanistan and the Factors for India

By,Dr. Gouri Sankar Nag, Associate Professor and Head, Department of Political Science, Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, West Bengal, India

After initial hesitation India has shown a welcome turnaround to signal a shift in her hitherto posture to participate in the Afghan peace process that involves Taliban. Two seasoned diplomats namely Amar Sinha and T C A Raghavan have already been handpicked to attend the conference convened by Russia on November 9, 2018.
In fact, India’s positive response to dialogues for peace and development in Afghanistan is in line with India’s consistent intent although laced with hesitation to engage herself in Afghanistan as foreign policy agenda. One prime factor underlining the thread of hesitation characterising sort of catch 22 situation, according to Davood Moradim, was a feeling of imperative to develop strategic ties with Afghanistan on one hand, yet a kind of reverse pull lest such involvement in Afghan affairs mount India’s regional entanglement (Chandra, 2015). Hence, to India the idea of strategic partnership with Afghanistan is considered important but simultaneously costly if it grows into intense and robust partnership and networking overruling inter alia her bilateral equations with Pakistan that intercede and intrude to constrain and facilitate the evolving dynamics of this mutual cooperation. Even it is not the question of hurry or joining the competitive fray with China since latter is all out to enter the terrain keeping in mind its ambitious course of One Belt One Road project or playing proxy as if it’s an opportune moment for India to step in as US is withdrawing militarily. The point of competition also emerges among the contending parties since pressures are building up leading to back channel diplomacy with Taliban and for holding informal meetings to bring together main warring sides i.e. the new elected Afghan government and the Taliban. India’s objection to share negotiating table with Taliban is not the question of rigidly sticking to a blind spot or the memory of wound that India had to suffer when flight IC-814 was highjacked in 1999. Nevertheless, it was a lesson as to how Afghanistan was virtually made into a Pakistani satellite sheltering al-Qa‘ida operatives. And today it is the same Pakistani state that keeps pestering for patch-up terms with Taliban. Needless to say that if such path is taken it would allow Pakistan to get an upper hand in shaping future course in Afghanistan.

Now let us turn to Russia’s surge of interest in the peace talks in this beleaguered state and society which remains largely mediaeval and trapped into “terror producing Directorate of Pakistani state, the Salafi regime of Saudi Arabia” and various indigenous factions of armed militia aligned today mainly with Taliban and the Islamic State. So apparently this poses the hardest challenge to transform it into a democratic, industrialised and secular polity. But that it won’t be a cakewalk must have convinced Moscow also, despite its boldness and in view of “agony of the British and American commanders” in the perilous terrain of the troubled land. Then why it displays so much of interest can be partly gauged if we look around to broader international scenario in which Russia’s involvement and backing to favour Bashar regime in Syria to successfully stave off IS is taken into account. So, when US role in this region and also its military campaign in Afghanistan in which according to some Russian sources, US might have colluded with the Islamic State to explore chances of relative success, were all abortive attempts, Russia was enthused to catch fish in the troubled water with its deeper understanding and experience of the zipper land and perhaps by utilising its traditional hold over the Central Asian republics.

Since 2007 Russia is slowly coming out of a ‘a period of stagnation’ and steadily emerging as the new aspirant to broker peace and security talks for Afghanistan that continues to suffer from frailties of parties and their failure to reach consensus sometimes due to lack of involvement of all stakeholders including Taliban in the peace talks or sometimes for adamant position taken by one or the other parties as Taliban did by setting unilateral precondition that withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan to be ensured before such negotiation could be held.

India, from the very beginning was opposed to any negotiation with Taliban simply because she was committed to fight three evils together i.e. extremism, terrorism and separatism. Since Taliban and Al Qu‘ida were fundamentalist groups adopting extremist paths to wrest political control of Afghanistan, there was no question of taking a soft stance towards these militant outfits. In contrast, it may be noted that Pakistan was the first of the three countries to officially recognise the new Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 1996. It shows deep nexus and political understanding between Pakistan and Taliban. Still Pakistan harbours Talibani factions in a bid to use these groups to reset Afghan affairs after its own design or even to pressure post-Taliban regime to adopt softer stance towards Taliban as well as on the question of Durand line running through the tribal lands bordering Pakistan. In fact, to Pakistan’s deep state i.e. it’s army, Afghanistan is a strategic depth that it needs desperately in case of future attack from India. It is a doctrine “developed by Pakistan’s Army Chief Mirza Aslam Beg” (Abdali, 2016). The idea was for “a dispersal of Pakistan’s military assets in Afghanistan beyond the Durand Line and well beyond the current offensive capabilities of the Indian military” (Sidhu, 1999). Hence, Pakistan which otherwise provides it trade transit facility via Afghan-Pakistan Trade and Transit (APTTA) and occasionally, under duress launches military offensive in the FATA province and also provided ground routes of supply for International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was later taken up by NATO, is always there to pose additional challenge for India’s role in Afghanistan. It is more so because India’s increasing inclination and commitment to Afghanistan especially after the strategic partnership agreement in 2011. This became a major cause of unease in India Pakistan relations. Although this “much-hyped Delhi-Kabul strategic partnership” has remained a non-starter, still Pakistan eyes every move from Indian side to reach out to Afghanistan as deliberate design to provoke tension between India and Pakistan. This apart, since Pakistan has fallen from the grace of US patronage with the announcement of Trump’s new South Asia policy last year which accorded India more favourable position, a new bitterness has visibly affected Pak-US relations on one hand and Pakistan-India relations on the other.

Also, two more points might strengthen our perception of such turn of events. One is Pakistan’s increasing hobnobbing with China and US-China trade conflicts, which is but a part of US grand design of Asia pivot and thereby to put pressure on China in Indo Pacific and in South China Sea. So, today when India is receiving US facilities and support not only in sphere of security (via LEMOA, COMCASA etc.) but also in terms of Quadrilateral equation and some sort of trade facilitation like import of crude oil and assurance to use of Chabahar port despite sanction against Iran, one may pertinently think that the US is planning to counter China also, to secure its interests underwater through India. So, today when India is going to join the peace talks she should be cautious about such perception which might not enable her to play required constructive role independent of US influence. It is because US is known for notorious plans of military interventions to alter geo-political landscape in case of rogue states. So far India cannot be blamed for such ulterior motive.
On the other hand, India should not also try to jettison the leverage that she enjoys out of her proximity to US because while India is equally open to Moscow, it may be curious to note that the ranks of Kremlin and Islamabad are getting closer over engaging with Taliban. Not only that, while Pakistan is known for its soft corner for Taliban and continues to abet it, Russia, according to US, is smuggling weapons to Taliban. This cannot bring about any desirable peaceful solution to the Afghan imbroglio. According to Yelena I. Rudenko, India is not simply talking about the need of multilateral cooperation to solve or at least mitigate the Afghan problem but she deeply believes that stabilisation of the situation in Afghanistan should be done, as far as possible, based on a non-military approach.
According to Rudenko, a number of Central Asian and Indian experts and official representatives support the “Greater Central Asia” idea proposed by the US, which comprises the political and economic unification of South and Central Asia through Afghanistan. No doubt, it would require calculated steps in that direction while all-out cooperation from all stakeholders from both within and outside the region are forthcoming. On the contrary, US military bases in Central Asia has not been able to eliminate the threat of terrorism from the region but rather it has emboldened Taliban, which was earlier concentrated in Afghanistan but now expanded beyond Afghan borders into Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Indian Jammu and Kashmir (Bhatia et al, 2014).

Hence, India believes that any peace talks in Afghanistan should invariably be Afghan government led and to be accomplished by the true representative of the Afghan people according to their appraisal of situation and aspirations instead of imposition of brute force in blind and monolithic fashion. It’s not the same as certain divisive western tactics to split Taliban or to induce and co-opt their moderate factions with ministerial posts or jobs. Neither Indian approach is synonymous with the Russia’s political sympathy to arrive at some working negotiation with Taliban so as to stall greater evil of “Daesh’s plans of pan-jihadism”. In the words of Dr. Indrani Talukdar and Dr. Nihar Ranjan Das of the ICWA, “It seems Russia is choosing the lesser threat amongst the lot”(ICWA Issue Brief dated 23/11/2017). Clearly India’s considered opinion is not to make a distinction between ‘good’ or ‘bad’ terrorists. This explains her stubborn resistance to engage with Taliban.

However, as an emerging power India cannot afford to stay away from the peace talk on Afghanistan. Else there would be misperception of India’s steadfast commitment to work out acceptable pathway to peace in the war torn territory. Finally it is neither mutual recriminations between US and Russia, nor it is Russia’s game plan alone or Ashraf Ghani’s policy of increasing bilateral links with Pakistan that can bring much coveted resolution of the issue of insecurity, animosity and lack of trust that continue to bedevil Afghan soil. The real healing touch could only be expected if we go by India’s repeated assertion to find solution through Afghan centered mechanism based on deeper understanding and wisdom. As former President Hamid Karzai in a recent interview has reiterated to include Taliban to search out the solution. This unequivocal call for participation in peace talks creates a moral imperative which cannot be ignored simply by sticking to conservative posture but which holds out a potentiality to bring ideas of accommodation and liberal power sharing. India’s shift of position is a significant indication of such prodigious realisation.